from National Security Archive
Kennedy Warned Israeli Leaders in (May)1963 That U.S. “Commitment and Support” Could be “Seriously Jeopardized” Absent Inspection of Dimona Reactor... and then he was dead
During 1963, President John F. Kennedy was preoccupied with issues
such as Vietnam, the nuclear test ban negotiations, civil rights
protests, and Cuba. It is less well known, however, that one of his most
abiding concerns was whether and how fast Israel was seeking a nuclear
weapons capability and what the U.S. should do about it. Beginning in
April 1963, Kennedy insisted that the Israeli leadership accept regular
bi-annual U.S. inspections, or in diplomatic language, “visits,” of
Israel’s nuclear complex at Dimona in the Negev Desert. Prime Minister
David Ben-Gurion and his successor, Levi Eshkol, tried to evade and
avoid inspections, but Kennedy applied unprecedented pressure, informing
them bluntly, in a near ultimatum tone, that Washington’s “commitment
to and support of Israel “could be “seriously jeopardized” if it was
thought that the U.S. government could not obtain “reliable information”
on the Dimona reactor and Israel’s nuclear intentions.
The full exchange of letters and related communications between
Kennedy, Ben-Gurion, and Eshkol, published for the first time today by
the National Security Archive, illustrates both Kennedy’s tenacity and
Israeli leaders’ recalcitrance on the matter of Dimona. Surprised by the
U.S.’s firm demands, Eshkol took seven weeks, involving tense internal
consultations, before he reluctantly assented. Retreating from a
near-diplomatic crisis, both sides treated their communications on
Dimona with great secrecy.
Today’s posting of declassified documents from the U.S. National
Archives system, including presidential libraries, provides a
behind-the-scene look at the decision-making and intelligence review
process that informed Kennedy’s pressure on Israeli prime ministers
during 1963. Among the documents are:
- National Intelligence Estimate 30-63, “The Arab-Israeli Problem,”
from January 1963, which estimated that if the Dimona reactor “operated
at its maximum capacity … [it] could produce sufficient plutonium for
one or two weapons a year.” This NIE was declassified in 2017.
- A letter from a U.S. diplomat in Tel Aviv who concluded that the
detection of an Israeli decision to initiate a “crash” emergency nuclear
program would require “a fairly careful watch on the activities of the
dozen or so top scientists.” This document was declassified in 2018.
- A State Department memorandum supporting bi-annual inspections of
the Dimona reactor to monitor the use of nuclear fuel. Without U.S.
inspections, Israel could discharge spent fuel at six-month intervals
“to produce a maximum of irradiated fuel for separation into weapons
grade plutonium.”
- Kennedy’s statement to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
that Israel’s nuclear program had put that country in a “stupid”
position by giving “a pretext to the Russians, who are retreating in the
region, to indict us before world opinion, and perhaps not without
reason.”
- A memorandum of conversation from August 1963 in which a British
diplomat reported on “new disturbing signs” of Israeli official interest
in nuclear weapons. Declassified in 2016.
- The detailed report of the January 1964 U.S. inspection of Dimona
that resulted from Kennedy’s pressure on Ben-Gurion and Eshkol.
read more here